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Summary
How should higher education respond to legally mandated limits on hateful, 
discriminatory, or provocative speech? Should public universities fortify go-
vernment rules in the name of equal dignity for vulnerable groups, by impos-
ing even further restrictions of their own? Or should they oppose such restric-
tions in the name of free speech? Or should they do neither, seeking neither 
amplification nor repeal, instead simply joining in whatever the government 
status quo happens to be, as they would do with most other background legal 
rules? This article advocates the second position: through a brief examination 
of “no-platforming” and “safe space” policies, it is argued that, within fully-
fledged democracies, viewpoint-selective censorship is always indefensible 
for higher education. Examples are drawn from high-profile controversies 
involving far-right speakers as well as pro- and anti-Israel speech. Viewpoint-
based censorship generates one of two scenarios, neither of which coheres 
1 The author would like to thank Kristian Ekeli, Rosa Freedman, Neve Gordon, Rebecca Gould, 
and Adrian Howe for their helpful comments, as well as Hrvoje Cvijanović and the Faculty of 
Political Sciences at the University of Zagreb for the invitation to present ideas in this article 
at the International Symposium Hate Speech, Symbols and Memories in June 2018. Some of the 
ideas are adopted from previously published opinion pieces including: “UC Berkeley, Donald 
Trump and the muddled ethics of no-platforming”, The Raw Story, 14 February 2017, https://
www.rawstory.com/2017/02/uc-berkeley-donald-trump-and-the-muddled-ethics-of-no-plat-
forming/ (retrieved 1 Aug 2018); “Israel, no-platforming – and why there’s no such thing as 
‘narrow exceptions’ to campus free speech”, The Conversation, 30 April 2017, https://thecon-
versation.com/israel-no-platforming-and-why-theres-no-such-thing-as-narrow-exceptions-to-
campus-free-speech-76907 (retrieved 1 Aug 2018); and “Are you sitting comfortably? How 
safe spaces became dangerous”, Free Speech Debate, 5 December 2017, http://freespeechde-
bate.com/discuss/are-you-sitting-comfortably-how-safe-spaces-became-dangerous/ (retrieved 
1 Aug 2018).
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with the mission of higher education. One the one hand, no-platformers’ de-
clared principles could never be applied with ethical coherence without be-
coming so broad as to require massive censorship. On the other hand, if those 
principles are to apply only rarely, then they lose internal consistency and be-
come outright ad hoc impositions of campus decision-makers’ own political 
preferences.
Keywords: Antisemitism, Campus Speech, Democracy, Far Right, Free Speech, 
Higher Education, Israel-Palestine, Leftism, Liberalism
1. Introduction
Governments have long regulated speech deemed to be extreme, hateful, danger-
ous, or provocative. In the West typical limits traditionally fell under such headings 
as treason, sedition, public order (ordre public), blasphemy, incitement to violence 
(Volksverhetzung), or lèse majesté (Majestätsbeleidigung). Those older laws mostly 
protected government interests and majority sentiments, but sometimes also vulne-
rable social groups (Rohrßen, 2009). From the Middle Ages through to the American 
civil rights movement, battles for free speech were led by political progressives. For 
example, despite Karl Marx’s searing critiques of individual rights regimes (Marx, 
1956b), he never collapsed free speech into a purely rights-based interest in the 
manner of a private property right. He sought abolition of censorship as an unequi-
vocal political advance (Marx, 1956a).2
By the 1980s, opinion on the left was nevertheless shifting. Spurred by out-
breaks of racist, sexist and homophobic incidents on US university campuses, wri-
ters adopted the concept of “hate speech” to denote derogatory or threatening ex-
pression targeting vulnerable groups (Matsuda, 1993). At the same time, feminists 
identified within pornography (Dworkin, 1981) and within everyday speech situ-
ations (Tr ömel-Plötz, 1984) various paradigm instances of women’s subordination. 
Critical theorists suggested that free speech amounts to a sheer tool for powerful 
interests (Heinze, 2008). The concept of “hate speech” has since spread throughout 
the English-speaking world and beyond (discours de la haine, discurso de odio, 
Hassrede).3 What emerged was a curious swap. Growing numbers of conservatives, 
who had traditionally been linked to censorship, started donning the libertarian 
mantel. Meanwhile, somewhere between left and right, opinion within mainstream 
liberal thought predictably divided.4 Some moderates maintained the traditional 
2 See also Heinze, 2018, 31 May – 1 June 2018.
3 See, e.g., Pech, 2003; Nieuwenhuis, 2011; Josende, 2010; Noorloos, 2012; Barendt, 2007.
4 For samples of opinion across the spectrum, see, e.g., Hare and Weinstein, 2009; Herz and 
Molnar, 2012.
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civil liberties stance (Stro ssen, 1990),5 whilst others endorsed some form of hate 
speech bans (Waldron, 2012; Thiel, 2003; Heyman, 2009).
In recent years campus activists have increasingly called for limits on speech. 
Reports continue to break about campaigns to deny or to retract invitations for 
speakers whose views are deemed threatening to vulnerable social groups. That 
practice commonly falls under the headings of “no-platforming” or “safe spaces”. 
A 2016 survey indicates that large majorities of UK university students support no-
platforming.6 Should such findings ring alarm bells? Certainly, not all such cam-
paigns succeed.7 Even when they do, shall we not just say that students are still at 
exploratory phases in their lives and do not necessarily represent their institutions as 
a whole. Unfortunately, far from being sheer caprices of youth, many academic staff 
members equally support such campaigns. To be sure, some leftists have cast doubt 
on censorship. First published in 2008, Raoul Vaneigem’s book Rien n’est sacré, 
tout peut se dire presents not free speech but silence as the servile and submissive 
stance under capitalist power regimes. For Vaneigem (2003), when voices can be 
muted the state always wins. In the current climate, however, Vaneigem (ibid.) has 
found little resonance among his fellow travellers. Unlike his other works, no trans-
lation has yet appeared. Judith Butler (1997), also generally associating herself with 
the left, has gestured towards free speech, though in cryptically hedged terms, sug-
gesting she does accept some no-platforming yet raising doubts about where she 
would draw her lines (Howe, 1998).8
Debat es surrounding campus speech mirror those in society more widely, but 
there are also noticeable differences, reflecting the distinct purposes of higher edu-
cation. In this article I shall examine controversies sparked by attempts to censor 
speech drawing from Anglo-American higher education, where the notions of “no-
platforming” and “safe spaces” have exerted considerable influence. My aim is not, 
5 On the more general debates, see, e.g., Post, 1995; 2006; 2011a; 2011b; Weinstein, 1999; 
2011a; 2011b.
6 BBC Victoria Derbyshire “No Platform” Poll, ComRes, 23 April 2016, http://www.comres-
global.com/polls/bbc-victoria-derbyshire-no-platform-poll/ (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
7 Alfie Packham, “Boris, Tatchell, Greer: were they actually no-platformed?”, The Guardian, 
5 May 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/education/2016/may/05/boris-tatchell-greer-were-
they-actually-no-platformed (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
8 Butler subsequently has done little to clarify her stance, taking the highly questionable concept 
of “free speech absolutism” as an operative target, although that notion has never seriously been 
embraced by free speech advocates. See J. Butler, “Limits on Free Speech?”, Academe Blog, 7 
Dec 2017, https://academeblog.org/2017/12/07/free-expression-or-harassment/ (retrieved 1 Aug 
2018). On the error of assuming “free speech absolutism” as a meaningful point of reference, 
see below, text accompanying note 19. For a re-evaluation of leftist stances, see also Gould, 
2018.
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however, to examine UK or US legal contexts per se. Controversies around provo-
cative speakers arise in all democracies. My interest lies with identifying generally 
democratic principles, rather than focussing upon the details of a specific jurisdic-
tion.
Democracies today can be viewed along a spectrum. Contrary to widespread 
belief, US law does not stand at a “free speech absolutist” pole, which is not and 
could never be a legally meaningful concept (Heinz e, 2016). US law limits such 
speech as commercial fraud or courtroom perjury just like other democracies. What 
is distinctive about the US, and does place it at an extreme end of the continuum, 
is the Supreme Court’s aversion, under principles that emerged gradually over the 
twentieth century, to penalising speakers solely on grounds of their dangerous or 
provocative viewpoints, such as unsavoury philosophies or worldviews.9 Arch-op-
posite democracies in that respect are Germany or France, where certain extreme or 
discriminatory viewpoints may be penalised as hostile to democratic norms (Pech, 
2003; Nieuwenhuis, 2011; Josende, 2010). Other democracies stand somewhere 
between those poles.
Whatever the specifics of a given democracy’s speech regulation may be, my 
question in this article is whether public universities ought (a) to combat intole-
rance by imposing tighter limits then their national laws require, as no-platformers 
would have us do; (b) to oppose existing limits in a drive to promote free speech; 
or (c) simply to follow the status quo, as universities ordinarily do with other legal 
rules. I shall advocate position (b), which makes it easier to speak about democracy 
in general. After all, options (a) and (c) would depend much more on the content 
and scope of censorship in each jurisdiction. I shall not, however, discuss specific 
means by which universities ought to challenge existing law, for example, by pro-
testing it only in principle or by actively defying it by allowing unlawful speaking 
events. As a practical matter, few senior administrators, particularly within public 
institutions, would likely take the latter course.
I shall oppose viewpoint-selective restrictions on university speech within ful-
ly-fledged democracies, but will certainly aim to take seriously the concerns of no-
platformers. Particularly important is their view that they are engaged not in exclu-
sion but rather in inclusion, acting not against democracy, but in favour of a more 
egalitarian democracy. They aim to level the conversational playing field in a world 
in which hierarchies give the wealthy and powerful – often understood in the West 
as favouring an ethnically white, and particularly a male and heterosexual majori-
ty – the louder voice.
9 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See also works cited above, n. 11.
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One obstacle for the present analysis is that core concepts such as “demo-
cracy”, “public discourse”, “incitement”, or “fighting words” have spawned lengthy 
and complex analyses of their own, far beyond university contexts. Those concepts 
cannot receive full attention within the confines of a journal-length article if the 
particular situation of higher education is to be examined in detail. I recognise that 
leaping over those issues leaves crucial matters unresolved for readers not special-
ised in free speech law or theory. As I have examined those matters at length in Hate 
Speech and Democratic Citizenship (Heinze, 2016), however, I shall not revisit 
them here, but hope this article’s very limited points about higher education will be-
come sufficiently clear even without the opportunity to explore all elements more 
generally relevant to free speech.
I shall begin in Section 2 by examining controversial far-right speakers to ar-
gue that, despite such concerns, no-platforming does not follow as a rational solu-
tion in principle, followed by Section 3 where I also argue that it fails to achieve 
its aims in practice. In Section 4, I argue that “safe spaces” create the same prob-
lems. Whilst originally claiming benign motives, they have recently been used in 
inappropriately censorious ways. I then turn to the particular example of the Israel-
Palestine conflict, which has maintained a high profile on university campuses, wit-
nessing calls for censorship on all sides. In Section 5, I criticise an attempt to block 
an invitation to a controversial Israeli ambassador to the UK. In Section 6, I then 
turn the tables, examining unjustifiable silencing of anti-Israel speech. In Section 7, 
I conclude by arguing that universities within fully-fledged democracies ought not 
simply to refrain from censorship beyond what the law requires; they must also lead 
the way towards challenging legally authorised censorship.
2. Mill and Marketplaces 
In 2007 the Oxford Union debating society organised a podium about limits on free 
speech. Two invited speakers were David Irving, a prominent Holocaust denier, 
and Nick Griffin, then leader of the far-right British National Party (BNP). Pro-
tests within the Oxford community, endorsed by Members of Parliament and other 
public figures, sparked national headlines. For the Student Union president, such 
invitations risked conferring “legitimacy and credibility” on the speakers’ opinions 
(Taylor et al., 2007). But the debating society president defended the event: “I find 
the views of the BNP and David Irving awful and abhorrent but my members agreed 
that the best way to beat extremism is through debate” (ibid.). Controversy again 
arose with the society’s invitation in 2015 of Marine Le Pen, President of France’s 
Front National (re-named in 2018 the Rassemblement National). One Oxford city 
councillor called that invitation a “stunt”, claiming that local citizens “don’t want 
this extreme right-wing racist from France given a platform here” (Henley and Ul-
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lah, 2015). In a number of continental democracies, views uttered by Irving10 as 
well as Front National members11 had certainly been subject to penalties as incite-
ment to violence, incitement to hatred, or similar offenses. Such controversies are 
not unique to higher education; they form part of many democracies’ deliberations 
about the scope of permissible speech. Questions nevertheless arise about the stan-
dards to which universities ought to be held. We must re-consider the mission of 
public higher education.
One approach is to view the university on a contractual model. Compare it, for 
example, to an athletic club. States may certainly fund such clubs in one or another 
form, particularly within primary schools or other such youth establishments; other-
wise, however, we are not ordinarily required by law to pay directly into any local 
team. More typically, an athletic club demands dues if we individually consent to 
become members. Along contractual lines, the team may expel us not only for non-
payment, but also for breaches of other rules governing members’ conduct, which 
often go further than a nation’s background legal rules. They may, for example, set 
certain standards of conduct or attire beyond the minima required by law. On that 
contractual model it would seem that universities, too, could condition campus staff 
or student membership on adherence to speech codes above and beyond the existing 
legal rules. Consider a further analogy. Websites run by news agencies such as the 
Guardian or Independent are under no legal obligation to print readers’ comments. 
They therefore remain free to delete comments they judge to violate house rules, 
including comments not otherwise illegal in law, and irrespective of whether they 
charge a users’ fee. Readers wishing to join the Guardian or Independent “clubs”, 
be it only for the transient purpose of posting a single comment, are held to “club 
rules”. In the same sense, citizens are not ordinarily compelled by law to enrol 
in higher education. Universities might therefore be deemed justified in imposing 
“club rules” including internally adopted hate speech bans, and going further than 
the background national law requires. That contractual model, to some degree, al-
ready operates. Rules of classroom conduct to restrict disruption, for example, are 
generally accepted as a matter of course. A lecturer may legitimately remove a stu-
dent who continually voices unsolicited remarks, even if the words uttered in other 
settings would not otherwise breach background legal rules.
10 “David Irving jailed for Holocaust denial”, The Guardian, 20 Feb 2006, https://www.the-
guardian.com/world/2006/feb/20/austria.thefarright (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
11 See, e.g., “Chambres à gaz qualifiées de ‘détail’: amende confirmée pour Jean-Ma-
rie Le Pen”, Le Figaro, 1 March 2017, http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2017/03/01/97001-
20170301FILWWW00179-chambre-a-gaz-qualifiees-de-detail-amende-confirmee-pour-jean-
marie-le-pen.php (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
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Extending a contractual paradigm to the general expression of ideas nonethe-
less raises difficulties. Surely universities within democratic societies ought not 
to collapse into mere “information factories”. Exchanges of ideas often take place 
within venues independent of classroom instruction, including campus organisa-
tions formed for activities such as social activism campaigns, religious societies, or 
debating societies. For the university to censor speakers on grounds of their provo-
cative opinions serves not to pursue an academic mission but to dictate that mission 
a priori. Yet is that so wrong? Must the academy open its doors to any and every 
idea? Must it host hate preachers who advocate death to Jews and sexual minorities, 
or to neo-Nazis who shout “Whites only”? In the words of one anti-Le Pen demon-
strator, “Fascism has only ever been beaten when good people mobilise against it. 
Not by inviting it to dinner” (Henley and Ullah, 2015). In the interests of quality 
education, why not set some threshold higher than that of the background legal sys-
tem, demanding that discussion remain minimally compatible with basic values of 
tolerance or pluralism?
One celebrated response, perhaps quoted more frequently in recent years than 
ever before, comes from John Stuart Mill’s famous text On Liberty (1859): “If all 
mankind minus one were of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary 
opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, 
if he had the power, would be justified in silencing mankind” (Mill, 1991). Such 
reasoning assumes the epistemology of empiricism and natural science, widespread 
in mid-19th century British thought, whereby a seemingly irrational idea “may pos-
sibly be true”. Even mathematical truth, generally accepted today as purely tauto-
logical, was thought by Mill to be inductive in nature and therefore alterable on 
empirical grounds. The proposition 2 + 2 = 3 “may possibly be true” if, for exam-
ple, we could one day happen upon two discrete objects paired with two others yet 
yielding three.12
Looking back on history since that time, Mill still seems persuasive within 
certain empirical domains, such as chemistry or biology laboratories. Are we con-
vinced, however, that such an epistemology applies altogether to social and ethical 
realms? Do we really believe that a thesis justifying Auschwitz or the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade “may possibly” lay a serious claim to credibility? Do criteria of persua-
sion in ethics proceed in the same way as in chemistry and biology?
Mill offers a second, more plausible rationale. His better argument, particularly 
for higher education, is not that any and every imaginable proposition “may pos-
sibly be true”, but that, even if some are false, “the clearer perception and livelier 
impression of truth” emerges not when it is rendered into “infallible” dogma, but 
12 For a popular critique, see, e.g., Ayer, 1952: 73-75.
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through its open “collision with error” (ibid.). Essential to critical thinking is not 
merely knowing that something is true, but why it is true. That demand entails the 
trickier ability to show why rival propositions are false. Anyone who observes on-
line debates on heated social controversies knows how difficult it can be to defend 
ethical positions one had assumed to be self-evident, not only against “trolls” but 
also against educated, articulate rivals.
In the West, for example, we widely believe that slavery two hundred years 
ago was ethically wrong – a view ordinarily focussed on North American plantation 
slavery. But was slavery also ethically wrong two thousand years ago in Europe, Af-
rica, Asia or the Americas? If not, then when and how did it become wrong? Or was 
it wrong in some times and places but not in others? And where it was not wrong, 
was it therefore right? Are “right” and “wrong” too simplistic as final judgements? 
Mill’s “clearer perception and livelier impression” criterion targets anyone who as-
sumes there are straightforward answers to such questions and feels outraged at the 
sheer prospect of debate about them.
Mill’s position is sometimes described as positing a “marketplace of ideas”, a 
phrase he never actually uses, and which is more a product of the “roaring Twen-
ties” in the US, adopted by such figures as Oliver Wendell Holmes or Louis Bran-
dies – before the 1929 Wall Street crash. On that view, comparison of ideas, like 
comparison of products, will lead “consumers” over time to informed choices. The 
marketplace model admittedly forms more part of the folklore than the real theory 
of free speech, frequented more by pundits than by serious free speech scholars. 
Holmes and Brandies refer to it only in passing. Among prominent scholarly free 
speech advocates today, few have developed marketplace paradigms in any seri-
ously theorised way.
Mill’s model assumes what we find troubling about economic marketplaces, 
namely, the formal equality of all participants. The fear is that powerful interests 
speak with louder voices13 disadvantaging democratic deliberation in general and 
vulnerable groups in particular. What might worry us in that hypothetical discussion 
of slavery is not the topic per se but rather the balance of power among the speakers. 
Concerns about populism and media manipulation cast doubt on whether people will 
always make the best choices (Heinze, 2017b). On closer examination, however, 
historical evidence about intolerant ideas snowballing into devastating effects14 
13 That specific concern about manipulation of democratic forums through powerful interests 
certainly does not begin with contemporary critical theory. It was already a recurring theme for 
Plato. See, e.g., Gorgias 461b-522b, in Plato, [4th century BCE] 1997, pp. 805-865. Cf., e.g., 
Apology, ibid., pp. 16-36.
14 See generally, e.g., Tsesis, 2002. For more recent evidence of the mobilising effects of hate 
speech outside established democracies, see, e.g., Tom Miles, “U.N. investigators cite Facebook 
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invariably comes from non-democracies or from societies falling short of criteria to 
which we would hold democracies today, such as the Weimar Republic of the 1920s 
and early 1930s, US slave and segregationist states, or the already debilitated de-
mocracies of Rwanda or the former Yugoslav states. 
Over decades, thousands of books and articles have warned about such danger-
ous snowballing effects of extreme speech within Western societies, yet not a single 
author has documented any such causal effects flowing from what I have elsewhere 
identified as the general sphere of public discourse within longstanding, stable, and 
prosperous democracies (LSPDs) (Heinze, 2016: 69-78). In Germany or France, 
with their strong speech controls, levels of hate speech remain comparable to le-
vels in the US, which imposes fewer controls (ibid.: 181-194), and with greater ac-
tual violence in the US due more to lack of gun control than to free speech (Spitzer, 
2012). That reference to “public discourse” is decisive. “Public discourse” does not 
reduce merely to anything said in a public place (Heinze, 2016: 29-30); and evi-
dence does plausibly support the view that targeted, face-to-face harassment, par-
ticularly of a discriminatory character, can cause psychological harms (Matsuda, 
1993; Trömel-Plötz, 1984). Accordingly, few of the leading free speech advocates 
have objected to bans on “fighting words” (except perhaps at an untenably liberta-
rian extreme) (Heinze, 2016: 28-29). No evidence of mass violence exists, how-
ever, as to provocative speech articulated more generally within the public spheres 
of LSPDs. Contrary to assumptions of centuries-old democracy in the West, the 
LSPD model traces back no earlier than the 1960s (ibid.: 125-137). As the sociolo-
gist Ulrich Preuß (2002) has observed, the atrocities spurred by hate speech in ear-
lier and weaker democracies followed not from speech as such, but from possibili-
ties of rapid mass mobilisation that glaringly diminish once a state acquires LSPD 
character.
Those observations point to a crucial difference between, on the one hand, 
conventionally liberal and rights-based defences of free speech, and, on the other 
hand, a more distinctly democratic defence. A straightforwardly liberal or rights-
based defence must examine potential harms irrespective of venue. A distinctly 
democratic model, by contrast, identifies general expression of viewpoints within 
public discourse as politically constitutive – as the very constitution of any demo-
cratic constitution – and not merely as an indifferently exercised individual free-
dom (Heinze, 2016: 82-89). Under standard liberal models citizenship reduces to 
an administrative category, attested by birth or naturalisation certificates, passports, 
and the like. Under a democratic model, by contrast, the illegitimacy of excluding 
role in Myanmar crisis”, Reuters, 12 March 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-
rohingya-facebook/u-n-investigators-cite-facebook-role-in-myanmar-crisis-idUSKCN1GO2PN 
(retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
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citizens from public discourse solely on viewpoint-selective grounds is of a consti-
tutional order. The citizens’ prerogative of non-viewpoint-punitive participation in 
public discourse is unconditional. While viewpoint-selective bans do not wholly de-
legitimate a democracy, they do de-legitimate it pro tanto, that is, to the extent of 
the ban (Heinze, 2016). States commonly scoring high on democratic indicators ,15 
such as Iceland or Norway, do lose legitimacy to the extent they maintain such 
bans, but remain top-performers inasmuch as their freedoms of expression continue 
overall to enjoy the strongest levels of protection. To be sure, appeals to democracy 
arise on both sides of the free speech debates. Elsewhere I have nevertheless argued 
that theories of militant democracy and equal citizenship invoked in support of bans 
nevertheless fail to satisfy essential criteria of political legitimacy (ibid.: 129-137, 
153-162).
Many democracies, of course, are not LSPDs. On leading indicators, for ex-
ample, the United States has for years weighed in only as borderline.16 Younger de-
mocracies today face particularly great obstacles. Accordingly, viewpoint-selective 
limits on speech may serve at best as security measures, and even then only with 
adequate safeguards, in view of states’ tendencies to exaggerate security concerns 
(ibid.: 78-81). In no sense, however, can a speech ban be called an inherently de-
mocratising measure according to the view that a bit less democracy may some-
times help to secure more and better democracy.17 A ban serving to eliminate speech 
from public discourse solely on viewpoint-selective grounds is always inherently 
anti-democratic, even when adopted on legitimate security grounds.
Unlike public institutions, privately funded universities might in theory be con-
strued under a more strongly contractual model. A body such as a non-taxpayer-
funded theological seminary might, for example, legitimately expel a student who 
openly professes atheism on grounds of fundamental unsuitability for the institu-
tion’s core mission. For the most part, however, actual practice reveals a different 
picture. Private universities are widespread, for example, in the US. Not falling 
within agencies of government, nor are they formally bound by the First Amend-
ment, which protects individuals only from censorship by the state (although even 
there, partial state funding may complicate matters). In their declared policies and 
conduct, those private universities have tended to embrace First Amendment prin-
ciples. In any event, as my focus here is on state-sponsored institutions, I shall not 
pursue that matter here. 
15 See, e.g., EIU, Democracy index 2016 (London: The Economist, 2017).
16 The United States perennially fails to rank even among the top twenty states on democratic 
indicators as assessed annually by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU).
17 Cf., e.g, Gündüz v. Turkey, ECHR, no. 35071/97, judgment of 4 December 2003, para. 40; cf. 
Erbakan v. Turkey, ECHR, no. 59405/00, judgment of 6 July 2006, para. 56. 
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3. Principles and Pragmatics 
No-platformers object, then, that their aim is not to deny free speech, but the op-
posite, to ensure that those least represented will not be crowded out of the public 
sphere. “Universities should prioritise the voices of the most vulnerable on their 
campuses”, according to one no-platforming appeal, “not invite speakers who seek 
to further marginalise them.”18 Given ongoing problems of discrimination, figures 
like Irving, Griffin and Le Pen serve, on that view, to perpetuate un-free speech by 
reinforcing existing inequalities. The case against those speakers is consequential-
ist: if such figures are denied a platform, then their influence will diminish, even if 
only to a small degree. Is that claim credible? One Oxford student defended Le Pen’s 
invitation in a classically liberal, Millian spirit: “This protest is ironic and counter-
productive. Ironic because stifling debate is the essence of fascism, and counterpro-
ductive because the way to challenge these ideas is by confronting them in open and 
public debate” (Henley and Ullah, 2015). Indeed, leaving aside questions of politi-
cal philosophy, we can track that actual counter-productivity even further. Within 
pluralist democracies attempts at censoring high-profile extremists to limit their no-
toriety commonly produce the opposite effect. In 2017 unrest broke out when con-
troversial speakers were invited to speak at a “free speech week” held by conserva-
tive students at the University of California, Berkeley. Heated demonstrations took 
place against the right-wing commentator Milo Yiannopoulos. Prior to the protests 
Yiannopoulos, familiar enough among those attentive to media trends, remained 
unknown to much of the public. Pre-publication sales of his book Dangerous had 
been temperate. The censorship campaign turned him into an overnight sensation. 
Far from reducing Yiannopoulos’s influence, it immediately and vastly enlarged it. 
Orders for his book skyrocketed.19 If the no-platformers silenced Yiannopoulos at 
Berkeley,20 it was only to boost his presence in the rest of the world.21
18 “Cardiff University: Do not host Germaine Greer”, online petition at change.org, https://
www.change.org/p/cardiff-university-do-not-host-germaine-greer (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
19 See Hillel Italie, “UC Berkeley protests send pre-sales of Milo Yiannopoulos’s new book 
soaring”, The Conversation, 3 Feb 2017, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ameri-
cas/uc-berkeley-protests-milo-yiannopoulos-new-book-pre-sales-rise-soar-alt-right-cancelled-
talk-a7561356.html (retrieved 1 Aug 2018). The book publication ultimately took another course 
in view of subsequent events.
20 Katy Steinmetz, “Milo Yiannopoulos Finally Spoke at Berkeley. But the Protesters Were 
Louder”, Time.com, 25 Sept 2017, http://time.com/4955245/milo-yiannopoulos-berkeley-free-
speech-week/ (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
21 Yiannopoulos did subsequently reduce his public profile, but only due to a slur damaging him 
within his own political base. See, e.g., Patrick Strudwick, “Milo Yiannopoulos Calls Abuse Vic-
tims ‘Whinging, Selfish Brats’ In A Newly Emerged Video”, BuzzFeed, 11 March 2017, https://
www.buzzfeed.com/patrickstrudwick/milo-yiannopoulos-described-sexual-abuse-victims-as-
whinging?utm_term=.qyZKR0jk2#.onMX93Y7d (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
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No-platformers could well concede that boomerang effect as a price to be paid 
when we stand up for principle, and might suggest a chain of causation running in 
the opposite direction. One anti-Le Pen demonstrator regretted that the politician 
could “now go back to France and say she has been invited to speak at Oxford Uni-
versity. That is the kind of legitimacy that is allowing her and her abhorrent party to 
become acceptable” (ibid.). As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that the 
term “legitimacy” poses problems because it tends to be used in various senses. Un-
der that colloquial usage it simply means something like “acceptance” or “recogni-
tion”. Such usage differs from the stricter, deontological sense of denoting elements 
necessary for law to lay a claim of obedience (Heinze, 2017a: 636-639). That worry 
about legitimacy in the everyday sense of “acceptance” has no obvious meaning ex-
cept, in consequentialist terms, as a fear of enhanced popular support; yet Le Pen’s 
polling figures had already been relatively strong before the Oxford debate,22 with 
not a single subsequent opinion poll suggesting any leap in support at all. We can 
certainly rule out any assumption that the mainstream French media, scarcely in the 
habit of cowtowing to the far right during that election campaign, would somehow 
have covered the Oxford event less critically than the leading British media had co-
vered it or less critically than they were covering Le Pen on French soil. Once again, 
reality ran contrary to the no-platformers’ predictions. The French coverage proved 
far more scathing than the British. Headlines showed little interest in Le Pen’s mes-
sage, instead relishing the jeers of “Nazi scum” (racaille nazie) hurled at her on the 
evening of the debate23 – hardly a discouraging outcome if we’re worried about far-
right demagogues using prestigious university venues to boost their public profiles.
22 “Marine Le Pen en tête en 2017, des sondages à lire avec prudence”, Matthieu Goar, Le 
Monde, 30 Jan 2015, http://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2015/01/30/marine-le-pen-en-tete-
en-2017-des-sondages-a-lire-avec-prudence_4567091_823448.html (retrieved 1 Aug 2018); 
“SONDAGE. Sarkozy chute, surtout à droite”, L’Obs (formerly Le Nouvel Observateur), 22 
Feb 2015, https://www.nouvelobs.com/politique/20150222.OBS3116/sondage-sarkozy-chute-
surtout-a-droite.html (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
23 “Marine Le Pen chahutée lors d’un déplacement à Oxford”, BFMTV, 6 Feb 2015, http://www.
bfmtv.com/politique/le-pen-chahutee-a-oxford-861946.html (retrieved 1 Aug 2018); “‘Racaille 
nazie’: Marine Le Pen accueillie par des huées à Oxford”, L’Obs, 7 Feb 2015, https://www.
nouvelobs.com/politique/20150207.OBS1940/racaille-nazie-marine-le-pen-accueillie-par-des-
huees-a-oxford.html (retrieved 1 Aug 2018); “Marine Le Pen à Oxford: des centaines de mani-
festants contre la ‘racaille nazie’”, Huffington Post.fr, 6 Feb 2015, https://www.huffingtonpost.
fr/2015/02/06/marine-le-pen-oxford-centaines-manifestants-racaille-nazie_n_6629132.html (re-
trieved 1 Aug 2018); “‘Racaille nazie’: Marine Le Pen huée par des étudiants à Oxford”, Europe 1, 
6 Feb 2015, http://www.europe1.fr/politique/racaille-nazie-accueil-houleux-pour-marine-le-pen-
a-oxford-2365779 (retrieved 1 Aug 2018); “Oxford: Marine Le Pen se fait traiter de ‘racaille na-
zie’ par des manifestants”, Atlantico, 6 Feb 2015, http://www.atlantico.fr/pepites/oxford-marine-
pen-se-fait-traiter-racaille-nazie-manifestants-1993188.html (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
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Any suggestion that the event lent increased credibility to the Front National 
illustrates what I have elsewhere identified as the tactic of rhetorical consequen-
tialism widespread among advocates of speech bans, who insist on empirical links 
between speech within the public discourse of LSPDs and resulting social harms, 
yet without citing empirical evidence. Pseudo-empirical claims are adduced in the 
sense that pro-ban arguments take the verbal form of merely asserting some empiri-
cal link between extremist speech and social harm (e.g., “We must stop the speech 
lest it lead to violence”), with actual evidence remaining either undecided or indeed 
often, as in the Yiannopoulos and Le Pen instances, suggesting the opposite of what 
the no-platformers predict (Heinze, 2016).
Some no-platformers unsurprisingly abandon consequentialist theses in fa-
vour of deontological ones, that is, standpoints rooted not in empirical claims about 
harmful effects, but in ethical principle.24 Some no-platformers might well concede 
that they cannot demonstrate clear material causation between hateful public dis-
course within LSPDs and harmful social effects. They nonetheless oppose on prin-
ciple the promotion of speakers who propagate anti-pluralist ideas. Yet that position 
only leads us back to square one. We must again enquire into the purposes of higher 
education. We might certainly distinguish between, on the one hand, passively ad-
mitting an individual’s free speech and, on the other hand, materially facilitating 
that speech. “This isn’t about freedom of speech”, claimed the organiser of Ox-
ford’s anti-Le Pen protests. “She has the right to express her views; no one is try-
ing to silence her. But that doesn’t mean we have to invite her here to give an hour-
long talk and bring her bigoted, divisive politics into our community” (Henley and 
Ullah, 2015). That view again raises the question of whether universities ought to 
crack down beyond the requirements of the background legal regime. Le Pen’s free 
speech indeed does not entail any university’s affirmative duty to host her views. 
However, expressive prerogatives concern not merely the speakers’ freedoms but 
also those of campus members wishing to hear and to debate. Several months after 
Le Pen’s address a further Oxford debate was held to examine the limits of speech. 
One British-Asian student in the audience asked on what grounds other university 
members could legitimately deprive her of the opportunity to face and to interro-
gate intolerant speakers in person, as part of the university’s commitment to critical 
thought.25 No-platformers, in other words, even if we assume that they represent 
head-count majorities within disempowered groups, in no way represent some po-
litical idea inherently constitutive of those groups.
24 For a strong deontological (or “dignitarian”) theory, see Heyman, 2009.
25 “Should universities practice no-platforming?”, 19 Nov 2015, recording available at http://
freespeechdebate.com/media/to-speak-or-not-to-speak-should-universities-practice-no-plat-
forming/ (the intervention mentioned here draws from my personal attendance).
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Joan Wallach Scott observes, moreover, the irony, particularly within educa-
tional contexts, of renouncing channels of intellectual challenge as a response to the 
anti-intellectualism characteristic of resurgent populisms. Values of “knowledge, 
democracy, and the common good”, she argues, “must be reasserted in defense 
of the university and against the anti-intellectualism of the Trump administration” 
(Scott, 2017).26 Cass Sunstein (2003b) opposes no-platforming because viewpoint-
selective censorship within higher education (as well as in other social contexts) 
promotes “group polarization” and “enclave deliberation”. Those phenomena occur 
when like-minded people, such as members of a given social group or movement, 
focus on internal deliberation, leading them towards ever more extreme positions. 
In other words, after discussions with their peers, they end up accepting or thinking 
a more extreme version of what they thought before they started to talk (Sunstein, 
2003b: 11).27 
4. Safe Spaces and Power Hierarchies
Like “no-platforming”, the creation of “safe spaces” has recently caught headlines. 
In 2015 New York Times journalist Judith Shulevitz described a facility at Brown 
University in Rhode Island “intended to give people who might find comments 
‘troubling’ or ‘triggering’ a place to recuperate”. The room “was equipped with 
cookies, coloring books, bubbles, Play-Doh, calming music, pillows, blankets and a 
video of frolicking puppies”. In themselves such spaces are harmless and can meet 
a valid concern, as Shulevitz points out, by supporting vulnerable students such as 
rape victims.28 Shulevitz probed the Brown facility not because a room had been 
specially reserved for vulnerable students but because it had been set up in response 
to a controversial event. The libertarian Wendy McElroy had been invited to speak 
in view of her controversial rejection of theories of “rape culture” current in some 
feminist circles. But why should we worry about students gathering to blow bub-
bles or draw in colouring books? We may find it infantilising, but that is a concern 
about psychological preferences, not about expressive freedoms. Safe spaces of that 
type clearly pass any serious free speech criteria in the sense that students must re-
tain the prerogative to visit such facilities as an exercise of their own freedoms of 
expression and association.
That originally innocuous policy has, however, come to signify something 
more alarming. Instead of designating a discrete meeting place within the campus, 
26 I am grateful to Neve Gordon for bringing this position to my attention.
27 I am grateful to Kristian Ekeli for drawing the links between my points here and Sunstein’s.
28 Judith Shulevitz, “In College and Hiding from Scary Ideas”, New York Times, 21 March 2015, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/22/opinion/sunday/judith-shulevitz-hiding-from-scary-ide-
as.html (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
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designated speaking venues themselves have been policed as “safe spaces”. In 2017 
King’s College London hired paid marshals assigning them powers to evict anyone 
appearing to breach campus speech codes.29 That role confers discretion to decide 
what counts as a breach, a question often perplexing trained jurists. Safe spaces in 
the original sense of secluded meeting rooms may pose no threat to others’ free ex-
pression, but when the policy becomes a dragnet targeted not only at speakers but 
even at audience participants, that role entirely changes. “Safe space” comes to 
mean “censored space”.
Particularly pernicious is the abuse of the concept of safety. University cam-
puses within Western societies are often large, open environments. No such space 
can be rendered wholly free of danger, but they generally maintain security infra-
structures. In the eyes of countless people in the world who have confronted mass 
violence, such “campuses would seem celestially serene. It degrades the meaning 
of ‘unsafe’ to designate as such a controversial speaking event conducted in a pro-
tected campus environment. To label a controversial discussion a safety threat is the 
oldest trick in the censor’s bag” (Heinze, 2017c). Campus members facing actual 
safety threats are ordinarily free to contact campus staff, security, or local police. If 
they still feel unsupported, then that is the appropriate target of any campaign, as 
opposed to the ideas of a controversial speaker.30
Akin to such safety claims are inflated assumptions about power differentials. 
As already mentioned, no-platformers commonly argue that their aim is not to foil 
equal speech opportunities but to promote them, denying platforms to those who 
advocate unduly powerful positions in order to support marginalised voices. Promi-
nent examples have included attempts to no-platform speakers expressing reserva-
tion about transgender rights. Germaine Greer and Peter Tatchell, long associated 
with the political left, nevertheless became targets of such campaigns. Greer had ex-
pressed doubts about transgender identities31 and Tatchell had in turn endorsed her 
prerogative to do so.32 No-platformers understandably view transgenders among the 
most disempowered in society. Here too, the problem lies not with the core premise 
29 Eleanor Rose, “King’s College London deploys ‘Safe Space Marshals’ to ensure students 
‘don’t have their feelings hurt’ at talks”, Evening Standard, 27 Oct 2017, https://www.standard.
co.uk/news/london/kings-college-slammed-for-patronising-and-problematic-safe-space-mar-
shals-paid-12-an-hour-to-police-a3669151.html (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
30 Cf. Feiner v. New York, 240 U.S. 315, 326 – 27 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
31 See online petition, https://www.change.org/p/cardiff-university-do-not-host-germaine-greer 
(retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
32 See, e.g., Tracy McVeigh, “Peter Tatchell: snubbed by students for free speech stance”, The 
Guardian, 13 Feb 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/feb/13/peter-tatchell-snub-
bed-students-free-speech-veteran-gay-rights-activist (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
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that power differentials exist, namely, that great gaps of power and wealth do indeed 
inhibit equal participation, but rather with the supposed conclusion – contradicted, 
as we have seen, in the cases of Le Pen, Yiannopoulos, and others – that censorship 
campaigns operate to narrow those gaps.33
No-platforming is commonly presented as if it applies only under rare circum-
stances. It is nearly impossible, however, to name any serious social, economic, 
or political problem to which problems of power hierarchies would not apply. In 
a debate about market regulation, for example, we would not merely have to dis-
agree with, but would altogether have to censor advocates of free markets if we are 
to deny a platform to those whose politics may promote powerful interests at the 
expense of the marginalised. In a debate about education budgets we would have to 
censor those whose spending would entail cuts to disadvantaged pupils. In a debate 
about health care we would have to censor those whose plans inadequately deliver 
to persons most in need. In a debate about abortion rights we would have to censor 
those whose opposition would disadvantage women. We can multiply such exam-
ples endlessly. In each case any “debate” would be no such thing, as it could only 
admit one side.
The point of that apparent “slippery slope” argument is not that no-platformers 
aim for Stalinist levels of censorship, but only to suggest how arbitrary such cam-
paigns become once they cease to follow any consistent principle. The only alterna-
tive to such massive censorship ends up being ad hoc decisions such that speaking 
events fall subject to the serendipity of whichever committee happens to be tasked 
with deciding for the campus community what really counts as social exclusion. 
Questions as to who represents the empowering and the disempowering positions 
are, on some issues, precisely what needs to be debated. Economic liberals believe, 
for example, that free markets create the best prospects for elevating the powerless. 
A sceptic might find that view to be far more responsible for worldwide disem-
powerment than the views of Griffin or Yiannopoulos. But that debate cannot take 
place – not as a debate – if one side is barred ab initio on grounds of representing 
hierarchical privilege.
 5. Censorship of Pro-Israel Views
The seeming “slippery slope” claim is not that an ethical stance must remain free of 
internal contradiction in order to gain credibility, implemented either in its entirety 
or not at all. No such aspiration is achievable for any complex social controversy. 
33 Cf., e.g., Alex Sharpe, “Let Germaine Greer speak. It’s the fastest way to discredit her”, The 
New Statesman, 27 Oct 2015, https://www.newstatesman.com/politics/feminism/2015/10/let-
germaine-greer-speak-its-fastest-way-discredit-her (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
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The problem is that a thoroughgoing incoherence emerges not merely at the peri-
phery but at the very core of the concept of power inequality, once it translates into 
concrete choices about who and what ought and ought not to appear on campuses. 
To remain intellectually coherent, no-platforming would have to sweep broadly, 
censoring endless viewpoints; alternatively, to respect free speech, keeping its ap-
plications rare and exceptional, it necessarily becomes ad hoc, subject to the pure-
ly personal preferences of whoever has a final say about campus events (Heinze, 
2009).
Again, it is tempting to dismiss such incongruities as whimsical campus poli-
tics led by inexperienced students. Their more seasoned instructors, however, also 
embrace such campaigns. In 2017 two student societies at London’s School of Ori-
ental and African Studies (SOAS), the Jewish Society and the United Nations Soci-
ety, invited as guest speaker the Israeli ambassador Mark Regev. It was a controver-
sial choice given Regev’s position as government spokesman during the 2014 Gaza 
conflict, which subsequently witnessed Israel subjected to extensive criticism on 
both its military and civilian policies,34 and more generally on the state’s founding 
and history. The invitation sparked nationwide, indeed international mobilisation. 
As reported in The Guardian, over a hundred academics both within and beyond 
SOAS, joined by a number of student societies, requested that the university’s Di-
rector Lady Valerie Amos cancel the event  (Weale, 2017).35 No campus censorship 
campaign in Britain has compared in terms of the speed and scope of that highly 
organised response.
One of the no-platformers’ rationales was that “the format of this meeting does 
not permit Regev’s case, such as it is, to be subjected to any scrutiny”.36 To avoid 
the impression of censoring solely to promote their own politics, the no-platformers’ 
surface appeal here is to a prima facie legitimate principle: academic events ought 
to follow criteria of scholarly rigour. Countless speaking events take place every 
day in universities, however, allowing speakers to make all and sundry claims in 
areas of ethics, politics, and social science, but with no such mechanisms for quality 
34 See, e.g., Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and 
reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General: Human rights situ-
ation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories (“Ensuring accountability and justice for all 
violations of international law in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem: 
comprehensive review on the status of recommendations addressed to all parties since 2009”), 
UN Human Rights Council, 12 June 2017, UN doc. A/HRC/35/19.
35 A total of four signed letters were published, and as of this writing still appear, on the Fa-
cebook site of the group Free Speech on Israel (FSOI), posted by group member Naomi Wim-
borne-Idrissi on 23 April 2017, https://www.facebook.com/groups/FreeSpeechonIsrael/perma-
link/1877279302493531/ (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
36 Letter by 53 non-SOAS UK academics, ibid. (emphasis added) (also quoted in Weale, 2017).
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control, nor indeed any obvious way in which criteria could even be agreed upon. 
The usual avenue of scrutiny consists in questions and comments posed by persons 
in attendance – indeed sometimes for only brief time frames.
That claim can have only one possible meaning, namely, that “the format of 
[Regev’s] meeting” had somehow been engineered to preclude such genuine ex-
changes of questions and comments. The event, on that view, would merely stage 
a scripted recitation, followed either by no questions at all, or by planted questions 
to be posed by pro-Israeli audience members, or by only fleeting opportunities ex-
tended to participants at large for genuinely critical questions. A statement posted 
online by the SOAS Students Union makes that assumption clear: “We stand with 
the SOAS community in expressing our concern at Mark Regev’s presence on cam-
pus, and in rejecting the idea that our spaces of learning should serve as avenues for 
officials to put forward state propaganda.” 37
Two problems arise. First, government officials, both domestic and foreign, 
including from highly-criticised states, are hardly strangers to university campuses. 
Other foreign figures, too, have at times been protested,38 but never on any such 
massive and inter-collegiate scale. One might indeed argue that a central mission 
of higher education is learning how to expose propaganda instead of censoring it 
and thereby leaving it unexamined. Organisers of such events surely understand 
that government or other such representatives, charged to explain official policies, 
are, in that sense, invited for the very purpose of airing “propaganda”. The former 
Pakistani dictator Pervez Musharraf39 was invited to talk at SOAS in 2012 with no 
protest reported. SOAS Radio indeed aired the event,40 without any apparent staff 
or student opposition. Somewhat puzzling, then, is the apparent suggestion that Is-
rael advances its interests differently, “putting forward state propaganda” as if other 
invited officials, who prompt no such resistance, somehow do not do so, or not in 
37 “Students’ Union statement on upcoming society event hosting Mark Regev”, SOAS Stu-
dents’ Union, Facebook site, https://www.facebook.com/soas.su/posts/1653350118013047 (re-
trieved 1 Aug 2018) (emphasis added) (also quoted in Weale, 2017). The same accusation of 
propaganda is included in the letter from 32 student societies at SOAS.
38 See, e.g., Helene Cooper, “Ahmadinejad, at Columbia, Parries and Puzzles”, New York Times, 
25 Sept 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/25/world/middleeast/25iran.html (retrieved 1 
Aug 2018); “Protest Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman at MIT”, Massachusetts Peace 
Action, 23 Feb 2018, http://masspeaceaction.org/protest-saudi-mit/ (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
39 See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, “Pakistan: Hold Musharraf Accountable for Abuses”, 23 March 
2013, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/03/23/pakistan-hold-musharraf-accountable-abuses (retri-
eved 1 Aug 2018).
40 “Pervez Musharraf: Pakistan, Politics, and the War on Terror”, SOAS Radio, 16 Feb 2012, https://
soasradio.org/speech/episodes/pervez-musharraf-pakistan-politics-and-war-terror (retrieved 1 
Aug 2018).
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the same way. Second, since beginning his UK placement, Regev had regularly vi-
sited universities throughout Britain. He followed the same “format” at SOAS that 
he followed at other campuses. Persons attending were generally members of the 
academic community, attendance having been checked by university monitors at 
the door. Each session, albeit usually held in the evenings and therefore subject to 
building closure rules, was normally scheduled for well over an hour. During each 
visit, instead of presenting any opening statement at all, Regev devoted the session 
entirely to audience interventions. Having chaired such sessions at two University 
of London colleges, SOAS and Queen Mary, I have always informed the Israeli em-
bassy from the outset that I had no interest in recitations from prepared scripts and 
would not welcome them. The embassy agreed in each case, confirming that it had 
not at any point been the Ambassador’s practice to deliver one. To my knowledge, 
Regev’s appearances chaired by others have been conducted the same way.
A small minority of attendees at each event indeed voiced support for Isra-
el. Overwhelmingly, however, the questions posed were critical, often stridently 
so. Attendees above all raised concerns, including some with which I personally 
launched each session, about everyday living conditions in the Occupied Territo-
ries, daily militarisation, use of force, access to resources and services, imposed 
checkpoints and identity controls, expanding settlements, US military and financial 
backing, anti-Palestinian and anti-Arab racism, the legitimacy of Israel’s founding 
and ongoing existence, and compliance with international law. Any groups or in-
dividuals wishing to voice opposition to the event were, moreover, free to do so in 
the form of organised protest. The SOAS no-platformers made no reference to those 
existing campus precedents – a notable omission given their public claim that Re-
gev’s remarks would be delivered without scrutiny. Each event was structured to 
consist of nothing but interactive scrutiny throughout the entire session.
An anonymous group identifying as “eighteen Palestinian students at Soas” 
wrote to Lady Amos maintaining, “The environment that Mr Regev would create 
on our campus for the event is unsafe for us as Palestinian students, many of whom 
have suffered directly at the hands of the Israeli security services”. 41 Such a state-
ment can have no meaning except insofar as it presupposes a more general ethical 
position, namely, that representatives of regimes whose victims study in the West 
ought to be denied platforms. Yet Western universities do host staff and students 
from such regimes, with no such degree of mobilised national and even internation-
al opposition from persons purporting to oppose repressive regimes.
A further complaint decried “the inability of students and staff – in particular Pa-
lestinian students – to participate openly in the debate, because of possible repercus-
41 Letter from 18 Palestinian students (also quoted in Weale, 2017) (emphasis added).
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sions on their ability to enter Israel/Palestine”. 42 A similar claim condemned “what a 
recent UN report refers to as the Israeli ‘apartheid regime’” ,43 maintaining: “We fear 
that if this provocative event proceeds as planned, it will cause substantial distress 
and harm to many of our students and staff who are, have been or will be affected by 
[Israeli] actions.”44 Once again, it remains hard to fathom how an Israeli official po-
ses that risk more than officials from a good number of other states whose represen-
tatives are not, or are only barely, protested. Once again, that is not simply a “slippery 
slope” or “whataboutery” claim along the lines that a principle must be applied either 
with exhaustive consistency or not at all. Rather, the lack of any comparable mobi-
lisation against persons representing repressive regimes suggests it cannot seriously 
be free speech at all with which the opponents of Regev’s invitation are seriously 
concerned. One might well entertain the thesis that full free speech will be allowed 
only to representatives of regimes which themselves fully allow it. If that principle 
is to be adopted, however, then university censors will be busy indeed. Given a rank-
ing of 45 in the 2018 World Press Freedom Index even invitations to US diplomats 
would not be self-evidently admissible,45 particularly given that the US can scarcely 
recite security threats comparable to Israel’s. For many years leading up to the SOAS 
event (and continuing still), events critical of Israel have been campus mainstays, 
including yearly Israel Apartheid Week events involving mock checkpoint displays, 
and “Die-Ins”, where participants or visitors could just as easily be photographed, 
if that is the concern, as at Regev’s event. It is unclear how Regev’s visit poses dan-
gers that such campus members are not already willing to incur. Visiting students 
and Western academic life generally are monitored on a vastly greater scale by other 
regimes, including far more intrusive censorship pressures, most glaringly China,46 
42 Students’ Union statement (also quoted in Weale, 2017).
43 Letter from over 100 SOAS staff. On doubts surrounding UN authority in its approach to Is-
rael, see, e.g., Freedman, 2013.
44 Letter from over 100 SOAS staff (also quoted in Weale, 2017).
45 Reporters without Borders, 2018 World Press Freedom Index (n.d.), https://rsf.org/en/ranking 
(retrieved 1 Aug 2018); “RSF Index 2018: Hatred of journalism threatens democracies”, https://
rsf.org/en/rsf-index-2018-hatred-journalism-threatens-democracies (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
46 See, e.g., Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, “The Chinese Communist Party Is Setting Up 
Cells at Universities Across America”, Foreign Policy, 18 April 2018, http://foreignpolicy.
com/2018/04/18/the-chinese-communist-party-is-setting-up-cells-at-universities-across-ame-
rica-china-students-beijing-surveillance/ (retrieved 1 Aug 2018); Tao Zhang, “How can scho-
lars tackle the rise of Chinese censorship in the West?”, Times Higher Education, 18 Jan 2018, 
https://www.timeshighereducation.com/features/how-can-scholars-tackle-rise-chinese-censor-
ship-west (retrieved 1 Aug 2018); Anders Corr, “Chinese Informants in the Classroom: Peda-
gogical Strategies”, Forbes, 28 June 2017, https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2017/06/28/
chinese-informants-in-the-classroom-pedagogical-strategies/#52f981eb12da (retrieved 1 Aug 
2018).
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as well as Turkey.47 Only the most conspiratorial view of Israel can rank its interven-
tions at any such level, yet we witness no such coordinated mobilisation in response, 
again suggesting the activists simply wish to censor a viewpoint they oppose.
The complaint continued: “The event could further cause serious tension on 
campus and result in a charged atmosphere that will be detrimental to the wellbeing 
of all faculty, staff and students.”48 The historical echoes of such a claim are nota-
ble. The authors attribute to a Jewish entity the power of a government mandarin 
who, merely by spending an hour or two on campus, can inflict “detriment” upon 
the “wellbeing” of “all faculty, staff and students”. Yet again, no government offi-
cial visiting from any other nation appears to have been depicted through that kind 
of discourse with such highly organised and far-reaching assent among professional 
academics (Benz, 2005). 49 One might argue that such rhetoric ought not to be read 
literally, that it merely forms part of the heat of political debate. But there lies the 
strongest argument against no-platforming, namely, that such debate ought there-
fore to take place as opposed to such claims being made to foreclose it. Lady Amos, 
a human rights expert in her own right, and a specialist in problems of discrimina-
tion, ultimately authorised Regev to appear (Weale, 2017). 
6. Censorship of Anti-Israel Views
Censorship campaigns are not waged only against pro-Israel positions. In 2015 a 
major inter-disciplinary conference was scheduled at the University of Southamp-
ton entitled “International Law and the State of Israel: Legitimacy, Responsibility 
and Exceptionalism”,50 described by the organisers as “unique because it concerns 
the legitimacy in international law of the Jewish state of Israel” (Siddique, 2015). 
The Zionist Federation of Great Britain gathered over 6000 signatures protesting 
that the conference would “legitimize the harmful message that Israel’s very exist-
ence is up for debate”.51 The petition hardly continued on a persuasive note: “This 
47 See, e.g., Frank Hermans, “Turkse studenten durven niet naar Nederland uit angst voor repre-
sailles”, Algemene Dagblad, 4 Sept 2017, https://www.ad.nl/binnenland/turkse-studenten-dur-
ven-niet-naar-nederland-uit-angst-voor-represailles~a638b18d/ (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
48 Letter from over 100 SOAS staff (also quoted in Weale, 2017).
49 On re-appropriation of antisemitic stereotypes within anti-Israel discourses see also regularly 
updated reports in The Guardian at https://www.theguardian.com/news/antisemitism and The 
Independent at https://www.independent.co.uk/topic/labour-antisemitism-row.
50 See “International Law and the State of Israel: Legitimacy, Responsibility and Exception-
alism – Conference Themes” at https://www.southampton.ac.uk/israelpalestinelaw/call_for_pa-
pers.page (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
51 “Cancel Your Upcoming Anti-Israel Conference”, online petition at change.org, https://www.
change.org/p/university-of-southampton-cancel-your-upcoming-anti-israel-conference (retrieved 
1 Aug 2018).
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isn’t about academic freedom. We welcome genuine and open discussion about the 
issues surrounding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But how can you discuss any-
thing with people who don’t even recognise your right to have a voice?”52 The an-
swer to that question is of course that no such discussion is possible, mirroring the 
“lack of scrutiny” point lanced to block Regev’s visit. A Zionist Federation spokes-
man insisted that the event would fail to offer “a valid academic discussion” (ibid.), 
there too echoing the “scrutiny” and “propaganda” claims employed to cancel Re-
gev’s appearance. In fact, both events were scheduled to be open to all members 
of their respective campus communities. Reciting concerns about its ability to pro-
vide adequate security in the face of possibly large-scale disruptions, Southampton 
University cancelled the conference. “It’s clear that security is a fig-leaf to stop the 
conference”, one organiser argued. “It’s ridiculous to say [the university] cannot 
ensure the safety of the participants” (ibid.). Here too, a safety rationale supplies a 
pretext for censorship. The Zionist Federation statement further claims, “At a time 
when antisemitism is on the rise throughout Europe, it is a disgrace that a respecta-
ble university would provide a platform to legitimise the idea that the Jewish home-
land – of all the countries in the world – is somehow abnormal. Israel is presumed 
guilty of the crime of existing, while no other state is being put on trial in this way. 
Southampton University – this isn’t a conference. It’s a kangaroo court. Don’t let it 
go ahead.”53
A counter-petition retorted, “It is standing principle and recognised practice 
that academic conference organisers have the right to choose those speakers and 
topics they feel would best address the purposes of the conference, without these 
being dictated to them by outside parties.” 54 That internationally acclaimed response 
was – surprisingly? unsurprisingly? – signed by several academics who publicly 
supported the cancellation of Regev’s event. Despite the statement’s even-handed 
phrasing, then, those supporters patently did not believe that all “academic confe-
rence organisers have the right to choose those speakers and topics they feel would 
best address the purposes of the conference”. That group’s thinking might perhaps 
be explained as a kind of “whataboutery” – “No free speech for you if we don’t get 
it too”. It is questionable, however, whether higher education is served by reducing 
free speech to a bargaining chip. Once again, if universities were to admit speakers 
only on the condition of “equal time” for those with contrasting views, their cen-
sors would be busy indeed. There are certainly viewpoint-neutral ways in which 
52 Ibid.
53 See petition, https://www.change.org/p/university-of-southampton-cancel-your-upcoming-
anti-israel-conference (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
54 “Statement in support of the University of Southampton”, http://freespeechsouthampton.
blogspot.co.uk/2015/03/pressure-is-being-exerted-on-university.html (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
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a playing field can be levelled, for example, by according equal time to all sides 
in a debating event. Indeed, there are even legitimate viewpoint-selective ways of 
levelling the field insofar as they do not entail censorship, such as creating special 
courses, journals, or media sites devoted to matters of race, colonialism, globalisa-
tion, sexuality, identity, economic oppression, and the like. I have thus far sought to 
suggest, however, that one postulate is never legitimate within a fully-fledged de-
mocracy outside a formally declared and judicially reviewable state of emergency 
(Heinze, 2016: 70), namely, to assume that either a democracy or its institutions of 
higher education can be enhanced by censoring a speaker solely on viewpoint-se-
lective grounds. Although no signed statement was publicly released to endorse Re-
gev, the converse scenario also seems likely, namely, that Regev supporters had op-
posed the Southampton conference – which would be an equally untenable position.
To distinguish pro-Israel from anti-Israel censorship, it has been suggested that 
the former has been initiated within academic communities, whilst the latter re-
ceived impulses from “outside parties” (Gould, 2018), such as the Zionist Federa-
tion. That concern becomes relevant, however, only once we do assume a posture 
of censorship, within which we would then have to decide who ought and ought 
not to be censored. From an anti-censorship standpoint, such distinctions between 
the university’s “inside” and its “outside” – which in many instances, well beyond 
the problem of Israel, would be murky at best – become irrelevant. Universities to-
day avidly promote polices of interaction with society at large, including innume-
rable sources of outside funding. Across the political spectrum scholars use higher 
education institutions as springboards for disseminating their political standpoints 
within the wider world. Anti-Israel campaigners have certainly galvanized univer-
sities to become political actors on the “outside”,55 far beyond any purely educa-
tional mission as conventionally understood. One prominent critic of Israel, Naomi 
Wimborne-Idrissi,56 holding at the time no appointment at any academic institution, 
coordinated the social media campaign against Regev (Weale, 2017) through an 
outside organisation.
Taken together, the SOAS and Southampton controversies reveal bad faith on 
both sides – free speech claimed for one’s own views, but no-platforming for the 
opposite side. Whatever no-platforming may represent in principle, in practice it in-
variably means censoring one’s rivals while admitting free speech for one’s allies. 
Commitment only to the speech we like is, of course, no commitment at all. In sub-
sequent conferences after the Southampton controversy, I condemned the 2015 can-
55 See, e.g., the BDS website at https://bdsmovement.net/academic-boycott (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
56 See, e.g., openDemocracy, 14 March 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/naomi-wim-
borne-idrissi/another-jew-suspended-for-antisemitism-why-is-uk-labour-party-making-such-
une (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
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cellation57 on the same grounds I have cited to criticise the anti-Regev campaign. 
Non-viewpoint-selective grounds may legitimately be invoked to limit speech, such 
as unmanageable noise levels, crowd safety, and the like.58 As to criteria based sole-
ly on the viewpoint of the speaker, however, either the commitment is to freedom of 
all viewpoints, which I have elsewhere called viewpoint absolutism (Heinze, 2006; 
2016), or it is to imposition of political viewpoints upon other members of the aca-
demic community: tertium non datur.
A further obstacle arises through the definition of antisemitism, and accom-
panying guidelines, adopted in 2016 by the International Holocaust Remembrance 
Alliance (IHRA) under the Romanian Chairmanship. According to that definition, 
“Antisemitism is a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred 
toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed 
toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish com-
munity institutions and religious facilities.” 59 Within anti-discrimination law, de-
fining groups, let alone capturing the typical character of hostility towards them, 
is never an exact science and always politically precarious (Heinze, 1995: 50-62). 
In addition, in view of concrete manifestations of antisemitism in the 21st century 
(Benz, 2005), the IHRA’s various interpretive guidelines are visibly drafted as res-
ponses to them. For example, according to one less controversial IHRA guideline, 
antisemitism includes “[c]alling for, aiding, or justifying the killing or harming of 
Jews in the name of a radical ideology or an extremist view of religion” (Heinze, 
1995: 50-62).
More controversial is the inclusion, as a form of antisemitism, of “[d]enying 
the Jewish people their right to self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the exist-
ence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor” (Heinze, 1995). Although people’s 
rights to self-determination appear as a bedrock principle of international law,60 that 
doctrine’s interpretation has been highly limited, with many claims rejected (Cas-
sese, 2008). In addition, examining actual or plausibly racist elements in the prac-
57 The Occupation at 50: Past, Present, Futures, University of Sussex, 11-12 May 2017; Aca-
demic Freedom, International Law, and ‘Balance’, Sussex Centre for Human Rights Research 
Roundtable, 12 May 2016.
58 On the concept of “time, manner, and place” restrictions on speech, see, e.g., Nowak and Ro-
tunda, 2009: 1447-1474.
59 See communication of 26 May 2016 at https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/sites/de-
fault/files/press_release_document_antisemitism.pdf (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
60 See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. res. 2200A 
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered 
into force Jan. 3, 1976, art. 1(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 
2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 
entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, art. 1(1).
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tices of various states has remained central to historical research since the mid-20th 
century, notably in critical race theory and post-colonial studies. Scholars sympa-
thetic to the Israeli state, and opposed to the singling out of Israel through boycotts 
and other mobilised actions, can nevertheless fairly examine racist histories in Is-
rael not different in principle from those of many other states.
Many criticisms of Israel amount to antisemitism while others do not. A peril-
ously grey area remains between those two stances. Some of the IHRA guidelines 
appear context-specific – more plausible in some contexts, less so in others. It is 
precisely such controversies that must be raised within the framework of academic 
discussion, and not as threshold criteria for precluding it.61 How far viewpoint ab-
solutism must extend beyond open campus speech is a harder question. Allegations 
have arisen, for example, of censorship imposed through hiring and tenure deci-
sions.62 Those involve further questions of employment law and of university hiring 
and tenure criteria, which, although vital to the present topic, will require separate 
examination. 
7. Challenging the Background Regime?
My focus thus far has been on challenging the widespread view that universities 
ought to censor beyond what the law requires. The principle of viewpoint absolut-
ism, by contrast, suggests that democratic universities ought to oppose such limits. 
The foregoing discussion has not examined non-democracies, nor weaker or transi-
tional democracies, within which legitimate security concerns might arise (Heinze, 
2016: 78-81), but has instead assumed longstanding, stable and prosperous demo-
cracies (LSPDs). Elsewhere I have challenged our tendencies to assume that libe-
ral solutions and democratic solutions are interchangeable, arguing that they differ 
markedly in the terrain of free speech (ibid.: 88-91). Of course, “liberal” and “demo-
cratic” both mean many things, but the dominant liberal approach in Europe ordi-
narily takes the form of what I have called “value-pluralist balancing”, whereby the 
61 See, e.g., Charlotte England, “Free speech on Israel is under threat from groups conflat-
ing criticism of country with anti-Semitism, say academics”, The Independent, 1 March 2017, 
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/free-speech-israel-anti-semitism-universi-
ty-academics-criticisms-jews-palestinian-rights-a7605306.html (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
62 See, e.g., Claire Potter, “Racism and Tenure at MIT”, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
18 Feb 2007, http://www.chronicle.com/blognetwork/tenuredradical/2007/02/racism-and-ten-
ure-at-mit-on-friday/ (retrieved 1 Aug 2018); Conor Friedersdorf, “Stripping a Professor of 
Tenure Over a Blog Post”, The Atlantic, 9 Feb 2015, https://www.theatlantic.com/education/
archive/2015/02/stripping-a-professor-of-tenure-over-a-blog-post/385280/ (retrieved 1 Aug 
2018); Robert Mackey, “Professor’s Angry Tweets on Gaza Cost Him a Job”, The New York 
Times, 12 Sept 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/world/middleeast/professors-angry-
tweets-on-gaza-cost-him-a-job.html (retrieved 1 Aug 2018).
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message of the speech is weighed against other social values. To be sure, states and 
public universities must evaluate a range of factors in the regulation of speech, but I 
have argued that the one thing neither can do with democratic legitimacy is to “ba-
lance away” a particular message solely on grounds of its objectionable worldview. 63
In contrast to an approach focussed on assessments of the viewpoint expressed, 
a distinctly democratic approach focusses on the forum of expression as a sphere 
of open exchange. The real problem with hate preachers or other extremists has not 
been their messages as such, but rather invitations on campuses without full com-
munity knowledge, in meetings sometimes having a secretive, semi-private charac-
ter despite availing themselves of campus facilities. In pursuance of the academic 
mission, it is legitimate for the university to impose structural instead of viewpoint-
selective criteria. First, for example, the university may legitimately require open 
identification of the sponsoring individual, organisation, or department. That step 
in itself constitutes the event’s first speech act. It not only announces the occur-
rence of the event, but acknowledges a responsibility towards the campus com-
munity. Second, universities may legitimately prescribe designated channels, such 
as university websites and notice boards for ensuring adequate advertisement of 
events to the entire campus community. Third, universities may legitimately ensure 
open opportunities for all community members, or as many as possible, to attend 
by ensuring adequate spatial facilities. Fourth, universities may impose at least a 
presumption of timeframes for meaningful, more than cosmetic audience participa-
tion. The point is not that universities must do those things, but might legitimately 
do them in lieu of making elite assessments about the value of a particular speaker 
or message.
Note that, despite no-platformers’ concerns about enforcing dominant power 
structures, one remarkable feature of university forums is how rarely senior corpo-
rate executives seek out such opportunities. It is unlikely that their absence is due 
solely to busy schedules, let alone lack of staff or student interest. Some of us would 
eagerly attend a debate with representatives of Monsanto or McDonalds. Rather, 
knowing the potential of a university forum for critical scrutiny, such executives 
presumably stay away – that is, they self-censor, without anyone else having to cen-
sor them – for reasons of image, reputation, and public relations. There is no fact of 
the matter as to whether university venues are forums for uncritical self-promotion 
and entrenchment of hierarchy. Whether they are or are not depends upon the aca-
demic community itself. When university forums are structured to prioritise scru-
tiny, some speakers will decline speaking invitations without censorship needing to 
be exercised.
63 Cf. Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 336 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting).
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Recall the first example cited above, namely, of David Irving and Nick Griffin 
invited to Oxford for a debate about free speech. Recall also that the Berkeley blow-
up was sparked by a “free speech week”. Those are but two examples of a noticeable 
pattern. Once a university censors speakers, it is that censorship itself which then 
prompts controversies about whether there ought to be censorship. Suddenly figures 
like Irving and Griffin are invited not to make points about racism, where they are 
easily defeated and made to look incompetent, but instead to vindicate free speech, 
a core academic value which, in many eyes, starts to make them look like defen-
ders of reason. Under the principle of viewpoint absolutism I have proposed, such 
figures would no longer need to be invited for the sole purpose of proving the value 
of free speech per se, because that value would remain untouched. There would 
no longer be any point to inviting them in their coveted, almost glamorous role 
of “free speech martyrs”. Attention could instead remain focussed on – or rather, 
open challenges to – the actual ideas, which have made them controversial in the 
first place. Currently the law actively enables controversial speakers to mainstream 
their messages by drawing attention away from the extremist content towards a fo-
cus on their vindication of the democratic value of free speech. They end up becom-
ing the democrats facing down un-democratic law.
No-platformers may respond that speaking events aimed at challenging extrem-
ists rarely change their minds. But the purpose of such events is not to stage Dama-
scene conversions. Their aim is not the education of the speakers but of the audien-
ces. The risk of perpetuating unequal power relations through campus speech is, in a 
word, not a matter of pre-destined fact but of collective will. Whether objectionable 
ideas blithely procreate or face the grilling of their lives is up to the university com-
munity itself. Far from seeking ever new opportunities to censor, public higher edu-
cation must lead the way towards abolition of all viewpoint-selective censorship. No 
challenge is more eminently suited to the university’s role and purpose.
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